John Kerry - Iran Nuclear Talks

Diplomacy is Great. This Iran Deal is Not.

Note: Remember when we said we would not abide by the “stay in your lane” mantra that many people who write about sports are told to adhere to? Well, we meant it. If you were looking for sports, we apologize and hope that you’ll either read this or skip it and read the next column in a week. As always, the opinions expressed here are mine and mine only.

As we are certain you know by now, The P5+1 came to an agreement with Iran over Iran’s nuclear program and the sanctions that had been imposed in efforts to deter said program. We read the agreement in full and are utterly disappointed with its text.

The agreement language as to Iran reads like a little kid promising to his parents not to lie again. In the agreement’s preface appears the following language:

Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic considerations, in accordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building confidence and encouraging international cooperation.” That is a great sentiment and I would love if it were so; however, Iran has done nothing to demonstrate that it wishes to build confidence and encourage international cooperation unless “international cooperation” is code for “buying weapons from other countries.”

Instead, all Iran has shown in the recent past is a willingness to thwart internal dissent by any means necessary and even make an assassination attempt on a foreign ambassador going to the UN. Was Iran acting in a trustworthy fashion toward the rest of the international community when it concealed its nuclear program underground and continuously lied about it?



Here is another example of some troubling language repeated over and over with regard to spent fuel processing activities in Annex I, Section E:

For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter . . .” Pardon me if I am not reliant on what Iran “intends to [do] thereafter.”

Again, Iran did not voluntarily come to the table. Iran maintained for years that it did not have a nuclear program and then when that was finally too ridiculous to say out loud, they maintained that their nuclear program was solely for peaceful purposes despite evidence to the contrary in the form of enriched uranium, thousands of centrifuges, and a heavy-water reactor, all in numbers and amounts far more than necessary for a “peaceful program.” No, Iran came to the table only to rid itself of crippling sanctions imposed by the P5+1. Our editor was proud to go to Congress in early 2013 to lobby members of the House in an effort to continue and strengthen those sanctions.

So, in the agreement, what if Iran is planning to start its militaristic nuclear program after the 15 years are up, could it plan to do so? Not per the Annex I, Section E, No. 26 of the agreement apparently:

If Iran seeks to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel in small agreed quantities after 10 years and before 15 years, Iran will present its plan to, and seek approval by, the Joint Commission.” It’s a mystery as to why they didn’t incorporate a pinky swear for that one.

Let’s say, for the sake of argument, Iran decides to conduct its nefarious nuclear activities elsewhere within its borders and the U.S. or another nation has intelligence to that effect. Can we go in anytime and anywhere in Iran to verify? No. Not only would we have to present our evidence to Iran for verification, they would then get to reply. Here is the endgame for how that plays out as laid out in Annex I, Section Q, No. 78:

If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA’s original request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission, would resolve the IAEA’s concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA’s concerns. The process of consultation with, and any action by, the members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.

In short, Iran would have about a month’s worth of time to destroy evidence and/or move material elsewhere without any penalty. What is the point of this agreement if we don’t get to actually monitor Iran’s conduct except for in specified places and only after almost a month?

Also troubling is that according to Annex IV, the ceasing of the sanctions does not occur only after Iran has shown itself to be abiding by the agreement but instead coincide with the implementation of the agreement. In other words, if you were relying on someone who had proven himself to be dishonest, wouldn’t you want at least some offer of proof of honesty before taking him at his word? This agreement does not allow for that but instead allows Iran access to $100 billion of its money that was being frozen and/or withheld and in addition allows Iran to conduct business with regard to its oil. Iran will go from being in dire economic straits to being just fine in a short period of time. Why is that important? Because if you are going to sanction Iran in the future for failing to abide by this deal, you’re going to have to wait years again for those sanctions to have any bite because Iran will have jump-started its economy. The sanctions may “snap back” as President Obama has stated, but that snap won’t have any bite. What is the incentive for the mullahs to abide by this agreement?

Further, there was a term written into the agreement that had not even been brought up as an issue throughout the talks, or at least nobody had ever reported its existence: the lifting of the weapons ban on Iran. Per the agreement, the 2007 UN arms embargo for most weapons will be lifted in five years, and the ban on ballistic missiles in 8 years. Why on Earth would the U.S. agree to this? We know why Russia would, but how did the U.S. cave on this term, as if Iran would let the whole deal fall apart over the right to buy weapons in the open market?

That goes to the point about what has us most scared. Iran is not going to send a nuke to explode over Tel Aviv from Tehran or anywhere else within its borders. They’re too smart for that because they would just be drawing a bulls-eye over their own country. No, instead Iran fights its wars through proxies like Hezbollah and maintains plausible deniability. Hezbollah and also Hamas, which has received a multitude of Iranian arms in the recent past, would both like nothing more than to annihilate Israel, a sentiment echoed by the Iran’s Supreme Leader.

It is Iran’s proxies that we fear in both the near and distant future. They will be monetized via Iran’s upcoming access to billions of dollars. They will be further armed via the removal of the arms embargo. And their Anti-Semitic hatred never ceases to pervade the region. There is a reason why everyone from the ultra-conservatives in Israel to the “dovish” wing of the government have all criticized this deal. That may not sound like a big deal but Israel’s governmental polarization and dysfunction rivals that of the U.S. Congress in case you were unaware.

There are two questions that remain:

1) What could have been done differently?

2) What do we do now?

Let us begin this paragraph by saying that nobody has a crystal ball. Could things really have turned out differently? Nobody can be entirely sure; however, that will not stop us from playing Monday morning quarterback and analyzing how we would have played the United States’ hand differently. It also will not stop us and others from using logic and reason to deconstruct certain important decisions made throughout the process.

First, for everybody who wants to blame Obama solely, don’t. Iran has been developing its nuclear program for decades, not years. The U.S. knew about its program going back to the 1990’s. There is plenty of blame to go around so to quote our editor’s late boss, Jon, there’s no need for blamestorming.

We’d instead like to focus on the actions taken after the sanctions were enacted. You’re probably saying, “but isn’t it Obama’s fault then.” To that we would retort that if the U.S. had acted 10 years ago, or say, not invaded Iraq, thus allowing Iran to take over the Middle East, things might have not come to the last two years. Obama inherited a mess in the region and he cannot be blamed for what he inherited when he stepped into office.

Going back to 2006, the P5+1 came together to impose sanctions aimed at deterring Iran’s nuclear ambitions. That was nice but it was not until 2010 that the Obama administration got the group to impose the biting sanctions that derailed Iran’s economy and ruined the Rial, Iran’s currency. The 2006 sanctions were no more than a wrist slap whereas the 2010 sanctions brought Iran to its knees. The sanctions were working. Iran came to the table in 2013 and it was at that crucial point that the U.S. blinked first for an as of yet unknown reason.

There was no need to give in to any demand of Iran. It was their economy that was in shambles. Sure some of the higher ups in Iran got rich in the black market, but their enrichment would happen regardless. No, it was the Iranian populous that was seething and suffering due to the lack of support they could receive from their leaders. The election of a “moderate” in Hassan Rouhani for Iranian President only occurred because he ran on a promise of removing the sanctions. Now, the Iranian President is impotent without the ruling clerics, but still, the clerics were listening to the public, if only slightly. So why did the United States and President Obama concede so early in agreeing to remove sanctions when Iran was promising so little in return apparently, as evidenced by the agreement that came to be? If you have an answer to that and to the reason for the countless extensions given to Iran following the 2013 talks, then you are a smarter group of people that we are. Because we don’t have an answer for you. The U.S. didn’t get anytime, anywhere inspections. The U.S. didn’t get dismantling of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure. The U.S. didn’t get gradual reductions in sanctions based upon compliance. The U.S. got a pittance.

Some are arguing that ISIS is the United States’ biggest threat in the region and that Iran’s becoming armed and financially stable helps to fight ISIS. But that is a ridiculous argument because ISIS is a far greater threat to Iran than it is to us. Iran should be begging for our help with regard to ISIS, not the other way around. If that was the thinking, it just reveals how much the U.S. negotiating team failed to see what was around the corner.

That takes us to point number two: What do we do now? That question is even harder and has even more what ifs. If we abide by the deal then Iran will almost assuredly acquire a nuclear weapon, if not in 15 years, then shortly thereafter. Iran will obtain billions of dollars in frozen funds to give to its terrorist proxies. Iran will also acquire weapons to supply them as well. How do we stop this?

The only chance we see to stopping what seems to be the inevitable is in fact having Congress override President Obama’s veto and refuse to remove the United States sanctions. If that happens, the deal will not fall apart overnight. There is language written into the agreement that if such a thing were to happen, the United States has to try its best to override the effect somehow. In other words, the U.S. still has not breached the agreement.

The next question that follows is as to whether Iran nixes the whole deal. That is an easy one. Not a chance. Iran is gaining so much in this agreement that they will allow President Obama time for some maneuvering. If Iran is willing to wait a couple of decades for a nuke, they’ll wait a year to see how the Obama vs. Congress fight shakes out. We’ll lay 10 to 1 odds on that. Easiest money we will ever make.

If Congress does keep the sanctions that the United States has in place, President Obama will be forced to go to the P5+1 and Iran to see what he can get in return for what he believes will satisfy Congress. It would be his only option. That’s the option we want to see played out. Iran did not give up nearly everything in this deal. We want to see what else they’re willing to part with and we are willing to call their bluff to do it. What’s the worst that could happen? If it’s the wrong course of action, it puts us in the exact same place we’ll be in 15 years anyway, so why wait?

The sense that we, and many others get is that the United States wanted a deal, not necessarily the right deal. The Obama administration had too much riding on this. We sent the Secretary of State to the table to get this done. Iran sent a guy who could be blamed and discarded with ease if talks fell apart. The Iranians saw the United States’ desperation to seal the deal and preyed on it. That desperation is what cost us so much at the negotiating table when it was Iran that was really the country in shambles.

There is plenty more that can, should, and will be written regarding the deal that is in place. We accept that the U.S. now has to choose between the lesser of two evils but we do not agree that it was inevitable from day one. The U.S. was out-negotiated and now we must look at all of our options and figure out which one ensures our safety and the safety of our allies for the longest possible period of time. We think a Congressional override makes the most sense. We do not believe the status quo is acceptable. We do not want to leave Israel’s interests or our interests up to the idea of trusting Iran’s ruling elite. That is a bet that nobody will ever win.

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